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ABSTRACT
This paper researches the quality of democratic control of the public police
in a democratic society. Governance structures tend to be complex, reflect-
ing that in democratic societies the police perform a wide range of tasks,
both (inter) nationally and locally. Given the variety of police authorities and
consultations at different levels, is there room for adequate democratic
oversight? In this article, a theoretical frame on democratic control is
drawn up which is applied on the recently established Dutch system of
national police. Based on an extensive multi-method field research the
authors conclude that the governance of the Dutch national police is not
multi-level, that centralist influences are strong, that the mechanisms for
vertical integration of local concerns in national policies are weak, and that
there is a democratic deficit within the Dutch police system.
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Introduction
As police reforms are neither neutral nor technical arrangements but politically delicate operations
(Reiner, 2013; Fyfe, Terpstra & Tops, 2013; Van Sluis, Cachet, Ringeling, Sey, & Jochoms, 2013),
they tend to affect the distribution of power, authority, and democratic control over the police. This
in turn implies empowerment of some actors and disempowerment of others and, consequently,
tends to raise questions about the democratic legitimacy of the police (Ponsaers, 2015; Savage,
2007).
In this article we focus on changes in the democratic control of the national police in the
Netherlands, operating, after the reform in 20131, in a multilevel governance structure. In 2013, the
Netherlands witnessed the introduction of a single national police force that replaced the (since
1993) existing regional police forces. This has been a significant reform that changed both the
organization of the police and the governance structure of the police. The Police Act 2012 envisages
a structure for governance and democratic control that acknowledges the need for balance between
national and local governance of the police as well as robust democratic accountability. Formal
democratic control lies with parliament at the national level and with municipal councils at the local
level (called the ‘council’ from now on). However, the governance structure in the new Dutch police
system is actually rather complex. Spread out over local, supra local, and national levels and both
between different governance levels and at the same level, a variety of actors and consultations
forums engage in administration, policy, or authority with regard to the police.
The research question to be answered in this article are ‘Can the structures for democratic control
of the police in a system of multilevel governance be adequate, given the variety of police authorities
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and consultations at different levels and the presence of actors and structures which serve as linking
pins that cut across decisional levels?’ Most studies converge on the growth of processes of ‘multilevel
governance’ in policy-making, related to the often-combined trends towards supra-nationalism and
regionalism. Such processes are usually analysed under the angle of their efficiency, while their impact
on the quality of democracy is neglected (Papadopoulos, 2007).
The aim of the research is to present a clear picture of both the implementation of the provisions
of the Act on democratic control and the concrete practical consequences. For this purpose, an
extensive multimethod field research was carried out in 2017. Theoretically, we draw upon the
notion of multilevel governance and the ‘democratic deficit’ that is associated with multilevel
governance (Bovens, 2007; Papadopoulos, 2007; Scholten, 2013).
The structure of this article is as follows. In Section 1, the theoretical framework is presented.
Section 2 describes the case of the Dutch police after the reform and, more specifically, the
legislative organization of democratic control. Section 3 defines the methodology used in this
research. Section 4 presents the results of the research, answering the research question. In the
final sections, we draw our conclusions (Section 5). By applying the typology of governance in
a multilevel setting and reflecting on the explanatory value of our theoretical frame, we consider to
what extent the Dutch police system reflects balance in governance and democratic control as is
expressed in the Police Act 2012,
Theoretical framework: multilevel police governance and democratic control
Interrelated assumptions
In this theoretical framework on democratic control we start from three interrelated assumptions.
First of all, police work is multi-faceted and is performed at various levels, from ‘neighbourhood to
globe’. Subsequently, the police operate in democratic countries for officials who are politically
accountable to democratically elected bodies and, thus, democratically legitimised (Mannings,
2010; Marx, 2001; Terpstra, 2011). Thirdly, given the multiplicity of police tasks, it may be assumed
that authority and democratic control are spread over multiple levels (multilevel governance). We
delve deeper into each of these assumptions in the next paragraph.
Neighbourhood to globe
The existing police-based literature illustrates that police authorities always enforce police
systems to perform a broad range of different tasks (Devroe, Edwards, & Ponsaers, 2017;
Fijnaut, 2012; Koopman, 2013; Naeyé, 2014; Van Sluis et al., 2013). These tasks cover hard as
well as soft policing (Punch, 2010; Van Dijk, Hoogewoning, & Punch, 2016), sometimes referred
to as the ‘dual face of policing’ (Anderson, 2011). In this approach, police work means ‘the strong
arm of government’, (Punch, 2010, p. 203), including fighting terrorism, combating organised
crime, and protecting the unity and continuity of the state in case of serious and large-scale
incidents and disasters. This approach is the state-centred part of policing. These tasks tend to
structure the police organization along functional lines and strengthen unifying and centralising
tendencies in the police system at the national level. However, in liberal democracies, the police
are not only viewed as the strong arm of the central government, but also as the protectors of the
freedoms and rights of ordinary citizens (Marx, 2001; Noppe, Pashley, De Hert, & Huisman,
2013). Certainly in the Western world, the community-oriented policing model is common
(Davis, Henderson, & Merrick, 2003; Ponsaers, 2001); here, the police are close to citizens,
aware of community priorities, and doing their best to respond to them (Crawford, 1997). This
police model demands that society trust the police and vice versa. Working together closely for
and with communities requires organisational decentralisation and the empowerment of com-
munity police officers to deliver tailor-made solutions (Van den Broeck, 2002). Thus, if police
tasks are defined broadly, the police need to be simultaneously nationally (and internationally)
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coherent and locally responsive. As a consequence, the police system will display contradictory
centralising and decentralising tendencies simultaneously (Edwards, Devroe, & Ponsaers, 2017),
reflecting the dual face of policing (Bryett, 1997). This fact is reproduced in the organisational
structures of police systems (Devroe, Edwards, & Ponsaers, 2017).
Democratic legitimation
The police are responsible for the community under their care and accountable to the democrati-
cally elected bodies for their functions and tasks (law enforcement, order maintenance, provision of
miscellaneous public services) and for the way that they conduct themselves. This is a normative
prerequisite for the public police in democratic societies. In his overview of the literature on
democratic policing (Manning, 2010, p. 68) observes that there is no disagreement among research-
ers ‘that policing in a democracy is inevitably rooted in and embedded in the power of the people in
a modest agreement to make elected officials accountable.’ The police in democracies are subject to
democratic control, whereby the organisation provides for the legitimacy and the authority
(compare Marx, 2001; Terpstra, 2011).2
Multilevel governance
The third assumption is that, given the foregoing assumptions, both authority and accountability
have to be spread over multiple levels. As the ‘strong arm of the government’ the police should be
subordinate to the national governance actors (the responsible minister(s) or the department(s),
cabinet members, judiciary powers and elected political representatives). Formal democratic con-
trol is then exercised at the national level. In contrast, local democratically accountable policing is
associated with a certain degree of local autonomy in determining policing strategies and in setting
priorities in consultation with local stakeholders. Local political-democratic influence and account-
ability in policymaking is important as it can counter efforts to implement repressive and punitive
strategies at the national level (Das, Huberts, & van Steden, 2007; Jones, 2003; Jones, Newburn, &
Smith, 1996; Savage, 2007; Van Dijk et al., 2016). Democratic policing requires the political and
administrative embedding of the police at both national and local levels, ‘ a balance of power’
between different segments of government (Manning, 2010, p. 68). The challenge that this require-
ment faces is how to integrate both national and local dimensions into the democratic control
structure. Comparative research shows that in particular the ‘national-local’ or ‘central-decentral’
dilemma is important for shaping the police system, much more so than the international dimen-
sion of police work (see Fyfe, Terpstra, & Tops, 2013; Van Sluis et al., 2013). Because the notion of
‘multilevel governance’ can assist in elaborating checks and balances in governance systems, we
elaborate on multilevel governance as a theoretical framework.
Multilevel governance
The concept of multilevel governance originates in the study of complex policy processes within the
European Union (Bache & Flinders, 2004). Multilevel governance refers to the spread of decision-
making competencies from central government to other government levels in a setting in which
political arenas are interconnected rather than nested (Hooghe & Marx, 2003, p. 1–2). The
assumption of interrelatedness is in essence a normative stance, but one that is shared among
many liberal democratic countries (Bekkers, et al., 2017). Local levels provide arenas for problem
solving that can eventually also affect the national level and vice versa. Multilevel governance
involves ‘a large number of decision-making arenas, differentiated along both functional and
territorial lines, and interlinked in a non–hierarchical way; deliberation, bargaining and compromise-
seeking are the rule in governance arenas, which are characterized by cooperative relations between
governmental units attached to different territorial levels and by collaboration of these units with
various non-public bodies’ (Papadopoulos, 2007, p. 469–470). It has both a vertical and a horizontal
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dimension, i.e., cooperation and mutual adjustments between actors on different levels and, within
these levels, between multiple involved actors.
Multilevel governance is appropriate in situations where the multilevel character of a policy
problem is explicitly recognized because it facilitates modes of cooperation between government
levels that support the development of a joint approach towards a commonly felt policy problem. As
such, it helps to create congruence of policies between different levels, distinguishing itself by the
existence of some form of coordinated interaction between various government levels. This is
reflected in functional institutional policy structures that facilitate interaction and vertical integra-
tion between the levels. These are labelled by some as venues that enable ‘vertical shopping’ at
multiple levels. ‘If important decision-making competencies are situated at multiple levels of govern-
ment, this is expected to stimulate the development of influence strategies at these different levels’
(Byers & Kerremans, 2011, p. 264).
As Scholten (2013) notes, multilevel governance is just one of various possible modes of
governance in multilevel settings. He identifies four ways in which national and local imperatives
can be balanced, namely, the centralist, the localist, the decoupling of policy and the multilevel
mode. We explain these different modes in the following paragraphs.
The centralist approach assumes a top-down relationship between national and local govern-
ments. National governments formulate policies which local governments implement. The cen-
tralist approach is most likely to emerge when an issue is politicized on the national level and
connected to other national issues, and when there is a strong national framework for policy
coordination. It requires a strong central policy coordination structure.
In contrast, localist approaches involve more bottom-up approaches where local governments
also set policies of their own. This perspective is most likely to emerge when problems are defined as
‘local ‘and in need of clear ‘local’ tailor-made answers. For instance, they could be phrased as ‘close
to the citizen’, or ‘requiring practical knowledge’ (Scholten, 2013, p. 220). This mode facilitates
policy structures at the local level, combined with structures for horizontal policy learning amongst
local governments.
Decoupling implies the absence of meaningful interaction between different government levels.
As a consequence, policies at various levels may contradict and be in conflict with each other. This
approach may be found when, for example, various levels of government are involved in a particular
area of policy, but each of them defines the underlying policy problem very differently (Scholten,
2013, p. 221). This will mostly be the case in federal states with complex constitutional settings
(Devroe et al., 2017).
Multilevel governance is regarded an effective mode for solving complicated policy issues,
because of its differentiated perspective on problems, with national as well as local aspects. It is
a mode to maintain the balance between the different levels, because it presumes the existence of
strong vertical structures for mutual adjustments. On the other hand, the centralist and the localist
modes have a strong level-specific character, thus complicating effective multi-governance and
allowing for the growth of decoupling, which can go in all directions (Scholten, 2013, 220, p. 234).
Multilevel governance and democratic control
Generally speaking, multilevel governance often coincides with shortcomings in democratic
accountability (Bovens, 2007). Papadopoulos (2007) identifies four problems in this respect: the
weak presence of citizen representatives in networks; the lack of visibility and uncoupling from the
democratic circuit; the multilevel aspect; and the prevalence of ‘peer’ forms of accountability. Lack
of visibility results from the fact that decisional procedures in policy networks are often informal,
thereby facilitating the achievement of compromise. ‘Policy networks are largely composed of top-
level bureaucrats, policy experts and interest representatives. Some of these actors are only indirectly
accountable to the citizenry due to a lengthy “chain of delegation” (administrators), or only to their
peers (experts) or to limited constituencies (interest group negotiators).’ (Papadopoulos, 2007, p. 476).
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‘High rank bureaucrats are accountable to their minister, but this is administrative, not political
accountability, lacking the public dimension. Democratic control is much attenuated by the long chain
of delegation’ (Papadopoulos, 2007, p. 477).
Democratic control takes place ex post and ex ante (Koop, 2009), and, in particular, when
policies and targets are formulated in order to set priorities. In this way, the police and police
authorities can be called to account for their performance on pre-established policy frameworks or
results. In such a setting, accountability is more or less institutionalized as part of a cyclical process
of steering and control, irrespective of whether the accountholders were actually involved in
priority setting. Otherwise, accountability is rather limited and ad hoc with members of parliament
and municipal councils primarily engaging in incidentalism (Cachet, 2015). In our article, we
distinguish between formal powers and authority on the one hand (as expressed in legislation
Acts) and, on the other hand, the way these powers are implemented in practice. Accordingly, we
are interested in how key actors in the democratic control of the police play their role within the
frame of the new Police Act.
Case description: the Dutch police reform
In the following section, we describe the case chosen to apply the theory, and provide the most
important provisions (with regard to organization, governance and democratic control) of the
Dutch Police Act 20123 (further mentioned as ‘the Act’). In this paragraph, we elaborate on (1)
organization, (2) national and local governance and democratic control, and (3) provisions for
checks and balances. The same division will be used to present the research findings in Section 4.
On the police reform: organization
The police reform of 2012 included all parts of the police system in one force, the Dutch National
Police. Since then, the police functions under the authority of the new Ministry of Security and
Justice4. The 25 regional forces and the KLPD were restructured into 10 subnational entities (from
now on called ‘units’), a national unit, a police service centre and the police academy. The regional
units of the national police are the backbone of the new police system (Vlek & Van Reenen, 2012).
The geographical subdivision of the 10 regional units matches the new geographical subdivision of
the judicial system. A regional unit is composed of districts (overall 43), support services and staff.
Each district is composed of basic teams (overall 167), an investigation unit and a so-called ‘flexible
team’ (Bruggeman & Ponsaers, 2011). Basic teams execute all non-specialist, basic police functions at
the local level. The basic teams are meant to provide for a strong local anchoring of the police and for
cooperation with other agencies. These are important focal points of the unified national police force.
The community police officers are the key figures in these teams. By law, each basic team has to have
a community police officer for every 5,000 inhabitants, and this officer should spend most of his time
in his area (Act, 2012). In case of crisis, the police collaborate with the fire brigade and medical
ambulance services within the so-called safety-region. The mayor and the public prosecutor share
jurisdiction over the local policing, and these two parties negotiate agreements in the local triangular
consultation with the police. Within this consultation, the priorities are determined based on the
integral security plan of the municipality and the national priorities (Fijnaut, 2012).
National democratic control
The Minister of Justice & Security has exclusive political responsibility for the police system as
a whole, for the management of the police, and for police policy. The Minister fixes the annual
police budget and determines the allocation of police strength across the regional police units. He
also sets the national police targets and the regional targets that are derived from the national
targets. The national police force is headed by the national chief of police, who is the chairman of
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the management team of the national police and the single police director. He reports to the
Minister of Justice and Security and is responsible for the implementation of the national policy. All
regional police chiefs report to the national chief of police. At the national level, democratic control
is exercised by the National Parliament. It holds the minister of Justice & Security to account for the
way he manages the national police force, for his responsibility for the performance of the police in
meeting the national targets, and for the functioning of the police system as a whole. Since the new
Act, Parliament decides on the national policy targets as well as the draft financial management plan
and the draft plan for the distribution of police capacity over the ten regional police units. The
national targets are the result of a policy planning process, partly based on (bottom-up) adding up
local security concerns (Bekkers et al., 2017) and partly on (top-down) concerns of the Ministry of
Justice & Security and the public prosecutor’s office.
Local democratic control
As a legacy of the Napoleonic period, local authority over the police remains with the mayor and the
public prosecutor (Devroe, 2013). The mayor holds authority over and is responsible for the
maintenance of public order or the rendering of assistance. Where the police are enforcing the
criminal law or carrying out duties for the justice authorities, they act under the authority of the
public prosecutor (Act, 2012). The local authority over the police reflects the importance of locally
embedded policing, which is seen as a cornerstone of Dutch policing, as it has been since the late
1970s when community policing was introduced (Van Sluis et al., 2013). At the local level,
democratic control lies with the council. Local government – not the police – draws up a local
security plan that has to be agreed upon by the council once every four years coinciding with local
elections every 4 years. The security plans of the municipality provide the framework for the
exercise of authority over the police by the mayor, who is accountable to the council for the
implementation of this plan. The mayor has an obligation to account ex post to the council not
only for the execution of police tasks and the progress made in achieving the targets of the
integrated security plan, but also for his functioning as police authority and his responsibility in
maintaining public order. The council cannot directly call the police to account. The public
prosecutor is only accountable internally, through the hierarchy of the public prosecution service.
Provisions for checks and balances
In the Act, some provisions for checks and balances in steering the police and for democratic
control are made. In this paragraph, we elaborate on those provisions.
First of all, the Act installed a regular concertation between the minister and local police
authorities called the ‘National Concertation board on Safety and Police’ (Landelijk Overleg
Veiligheid en Politie, LOVP). In this set-up, the Minister and the chairman of the Board of
Attorney Generals, ten ‘regional5’mayors who represent their regional units, along with two mayors
of small municipalities representing smaller communities discuss the input of local police autho-
rities in setting priorities at the national level (Jacobs, 2015). The national targets are part of the
four-yearly ‘National Safety Agenda’ developed by the LOVP, and approved in parliament.
Secondly, policy planning is considered an important linking mechanism for steering police
activities at various governance levels. Police units are obliged to develop police policy plans for
a duration of four years (local elections) (Cachet & van Sluis, 2013). Regional security plans
integrate both local security concerns (of local security plans) and national priorities. The minister
monitors whether the regional plans sufficiently reflect national targets. Before finalizing the
regional security plan of the police unit, each mayor is obliged to consult with his own council
on the draft version of this plan. The council assesses whether there is an acceptable degree of
consistency between the regional plan and the local targets.
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Thirdly, the Act created a range of interlinked tripartite consultations for policy planning at the
national level (LOVP), at the level of the regional police units, the districts, the basic teams and
sometimes the municipalities. Within the regional units, the mayor and the public prosecutor
engage in tripartite consultations (driehoeksoverleg) with the police chief on the use of police
capacity needed to execute tasks set out in the integrated local security plan. At the local level,
triangular consultation exists at the level of one municipality, several municipalities for one basic
team, or for multiple basic teams. Tripartite consultations at the municipal level are compulsory if
and when the mayor requests them: this acts as a guarantee that the mayor can enforce municipal
tripartite consultations. Additionally, mayors of smaller municipalities can organize what is called
‘joint triangles’.
To conclude, the tripartite consultations are a typical Dutch aspect of multilevel governance
called ‘poldermodel’. With regard to the police, it refers to concertation-seeking for consensus
between judicial and administrative police authorities at the same level. This has a legal basis in the
Act (Prins & Devroe, 2017).
Methodology
In 2017 an extensive multimethod field research was carried out, with triangulation of quantitative
and qualitative methods and a combination of both ‘range and depth’ in the data collection (Bekkers
et al., 2017). This research was part of the official evaluation of the Police Act 2012 commissioned by
the Commission Evaluation Police Act 2012, which was installed by the Minister of Justice and
Security. The scope was the governance of the Dutch police after the reform at large. Therefore,
different methods were applied (triangulation). Figure 1 shows the different methods used in the
empirical research, which we explain in more depth in this section.
First of all, a systematic review of all existing empirical research on the Dutch national police
system and democratic control was completed. This study resulted in an extensive research report.
Subsequently, a content analysis of journals and newspapers was elaborated. This analysis aimed at
gaining insights into the perceptions and experiences of actors involved in police governance and
democratic control covered in the media. This content analysis comprised the topics and police
subjects in two national newspapers, a number of professional journals and web-based articles for
the period 1 January 2013 to 1 January 2016.
Figure 1. Mixed methods.
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Secondly, a nationwide Internet survey amongst mayors, members of municipal councils, public
prosecutors, and police chiefs was set up. The questionnaire, with a total of over 60 questions,
contained both open and closed questions. Some questions related to the extent to which provisions
in the Act were implemented in practice and how they functioned according to the respondents.
Other questions were about role fulfilment. How did key actors involved in governance and
democratic control perform and how did they fulfil their role after the Act? In total, 1009 responses
completed the questionnaire, which means an average response rate of 48%. However, there were
significant differences in response rates between target groups. The highest response rate came from
police chiefs at local (60%) and regional level (80%), from regional mayors and chef public
prosecutors (both 70%), while the lowest came from members of municipal councils (8%) and
public prosecutors (3.3%), A chi-square test showed that all response groups were representative for
municipal size and police region (Sig. <0,05). For members of municipal councils, the level of
significance for representability was 0.17.
Thirdly, three focus groups were organized with a variety of partner organizations of the police
on national, regional and local levels. Many different stakeholders participated in these focus groups
(48), making it a very rich qualitative study.
Finally, to acquire more in-depth research results, a multiple embedded case study (Yin, 2003)
was held in two specific police units: one in an urban area and the other in a more rural unit with
a huge surface and low population density. The selection of regional units was based on the criterion
of maximum variety in terms of numbers of municipalities (large versus small number of munici-
palities). Subsequently, the largest, a mid-sized and a small municipality were selected in each police
region. This selection enabled the researchers to study the implementation of the Act in police units
under varying conditions. The research in the two regional units consisted of the analysis of relevant
policy documents, in-depth interviews with actors involved in the governance and democratic
control of the police and the two focus groups. In the variety of respondents, the researchers were
particularly interested in whether and how viewpoints and interests of administrative and juridical
authorities were balanced. In addition, in-depth interviews were conducted with actors who were
involved in management of the police at the national level. In total, 81 in-depth interviews were
conducted with a mean length of 1, 5 hour.
Both the interviews and the focus groups were entirely recorded, transcribed, and analyzed
using ATLAS-TI. Code lists were developed by the researchers and tested on a number of
interviews before being completed for final use. Each interview was sent back to the respondent
for further information, and quotes from these were chosen by the researchers are used in the
final report (Bekkers et al., 2017). Consequently, the combination of in-depth interviews, (inside)
documents and focus groups led to an increased internal validity and a high degree of saturation
for each case.
Empirical results
In this section, we present the research findings using the same categories in the same order as those
used in the case description: governance at the national level, governance at the local level,
democratic control, and checks and balances. We examine how the different provisions of the
Act are implemented in practice and how key actors consider this new reality.
Governance at the national level
One of the most notable changes is the transfer of power to the Minister of Justice and Security as
the sole actor responsible for the police. The Act created a single hierarchical model of governance.
A solid majority of all the respondents to the Internet survey admit that the minister has indeed
gained more influence and that the national police are currently better and more uniformly
administered and national targets are better achieved than before.
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However, critical notes from the systematic review illustrate that the accumulation of roles in
hands of one minister has caused many concerns even before the implementation of the national
police force. In fact, the Act distorts the traditional model of checks and balances in the democratic
control of the Dutch police system (Fijnaut, 2012; Koopman, 2013; Terpstra, et al., 2012). Research
findings (in-depth interviews with key players) show that these concerns have not disappeared. On
the contrary, they have been reinforced with these multiple roles for the minister installed,
especially in the first period after the formation of the national police, which was characterized
by micro-management in administration and top-down target setting. In this section, we explain
both findings in-depth.
Micro-management in administration
The first stage of the implementation of the Act coincided with fierce police budget cuts due to
austerity problems. This was imposed by the national government as part of a series of economic
measures to tackle the economic crisis. At the same time, the Act had to be instituted, creating
a huge mobility problem for the many police sent to other cities. A high-ranking police manager
claimed: ‘The police were put on a drip, supplied by the department’ in order to realise the necessary
budgetary discipline. This policy was labelled ‘hands-on administration’ and was administered at
the micro-level as well, especially in the first stage after the Act was instituted. The centralisation
following the implementation of the Act had, according to almost all respondents, gone too far
causing great dissatisfaction and frustration among police chiefs at the basic team and district levels
and among mayors. Our results show the lack of leeway and flexibility in financial management and
the loss of support services supporting local operational decisions and tailor-made approaches as
two major triggers for frustrations. According to one police manager, bureaucracy had become the
leading principle: ‘The number of forms is endless. Business operations are centralised and the
number of FTE’s has dropped. Now everything has to be standardised and automated, but we have
gone too far in this respect.’ A district police chief complained about the centralism in purchases that
had gone too far: ‘I can’t even decide about buying a helmet for our bikers or buying local flowers at
the municipal florist for an event for the mayor. Even the flowers have to come from the central level,
which means again frustration for local businesses’.
Top-down target setting for the police
Since the new Act, the Ministry of Justice & Security has had four ministers. In particular, the first
minister, Ivo Opstelten, the driving force behind the Act, estimated setting national targets for the
national police as his prime responsibility. He was ‘hard of hearing’, according to an interviewee. The
first period of the LOVPwas not lacking in disagreements, sometimes even ‘lively’ ones. Disputes were
marked by attempts to demarcate the powers of theminister and the local police authorities. There has
even been a LOVP -meeting where some participants left in anger because of the (steering) attitude of
the minister. According to a regional mayor, this minister ‘was very much focussed on the national
priorities, which provoked continuous debate with the regional mayors who proclaimed that this was the
responsibility of the local police authorities and not his. This was very characteristic.’
Governance at the local level
A point of great concern in the run-up to national police was the local anchoring of the police.
A small majority of all the survey respondents assumed that visibility and proximity of the police
had decreased as a consequence of the reform of the national police. The focus groups pointed to
the closing down of police stations in smaller municipalities as a source of growing feelings of
uncertainty among citizens. The case studies show a significant difference in coverage ratio of
community police officers between municipalities. In addition, capacity shortages within the basic
teams (as mentioned by many police managers at both local and district levels) have resulted in
community policing officers being deployed as ‘backup’ for emergency assistance work, crime
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fighting and other non-area bound-related activities (such as daily operational coordination and
police enforcement at such events as football games). As a consequence, they are not (or not
available enough) available to perform their actual tasks, i.e., spending 80% of their time in the
community as community officers. Community policing is under pressure as was the observation of
many council members in the Internet survey (42%).
However, the survey shows that a large majority of mayors (82%) and a small majority of council
members (57%) are satisfied with the way basic teams operate within their municipality. In general,
mayors agree with the statement that the regional police unit does address the demands of their
municipality (81% in agreement), contrary to council members, of whom 45% did not agree with this
statement. A small majority of mayors perceives no actual discrepancies between national and local
targets for police, contrary to a majority of council members. There is still room for local concerns
and objectives. By far most police chiefs at the district level and the local level consider that they can
sufficiently meet the priorities of the local police authorities (mayor and public prosecutor). However,
a common complaint is that they do not have enough leeway in terms of finances and the number
and allocation of staff. This is seen as the downside of too much centralisation in business operations.
According to our survey, many mayors see the advantages of centralising and standardising
support services. However, many of them experience shortcomings as well, especially with regard to
their authority over the police. They see their authority shrinking by national policy frames,
especially with regard to police capacity. A mayor: ‘There is no room for adjusting the size or the
composition of police basic teams when needed. The police have become bulky and bureaucratic.’How
can mayors be held accountable in their responsibility for the total of local security provisions (and
the police) with no say on police capacity? However, most mayors argued that, at present, national
priorities and local safety problems often coincide. For this reason, the level of police resources that
are available for local safety problems is still sufficient. A large majority of mayors (71%) consider
the police strength in their municipality to be short as a result of the reallocation of police personnel
following the formation of the national police.
Democratic accountability and democratic control
National
At the national level, parliament controls the Minister of Justice and Security (the national authority
and ultimately responsible for the police). Our interviews showed that members of parliament were
not interested in participation in the research; nevertheless, the few that we could interview were
critical about their own role in this control oversight. They had only marginal interest in the police,
a strong preoccupation with daily life incidents, combined with too little restraint in relation to what
is and should remain local democratic issues. This self-image is in line with the perception of other
actors regarding the role of parliament. A small majority (52%) of the survey respondents appreciated
possibilities for more democratic control after the Act. This contrasts with the fact that barely 30% of
them stipulate that the democratic control by parliament has actually improved, and only a quarter
(26%) perceive that members of parliament have made better use of their possibilities after the Act.
In particular, mayors and chiefs of police express the feeling that members of parliament show
a tendency towards ‘indicentalism’. This impression in combination with the direct involvement of
the Minister of Justice & Security in police matters contributes to the apprehension that politicisation
of the police complicates the management and steering governance of the police. According to a unit
police chief ‘Too little distance has been created between the Minister and politics on the one hand, and
the police on the other, which makes the police vulnerable to the hypes and dynamics of the media.’
Local
Opinions of members of the council are split on whether they can exert sufficient influence on the
priorities of the local police. However, our survey shows that 73% of them perceive this influence to
be increased through the creation of a national police although more than half of them (66%)
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indicate a lack of influence on the deployment of police within their own municipalities. In total,
69% of all members of municipal councils found democratic control of the police to have
deteriorated with the formation of the national police force. It appeared from their comments
that councils have less influence and the gap between police and local government has become
wider. The mayors are more at arm’s length from the police and, therefore, also from the council.
National targets limit the room for local priorities, and community-policing officers are neither
available nor visible. They feel that they are never asked to confer with the authorities about
priorities nor are their priorities included in the regional security plan.
Other than council members, respondents and interviewees in our survey are rather negative
about how democratic control is exercised by councils.
Checks and balances
In the following paragraphs, we discuss the national platform LVOP, the local policy planning, and
the triangular consultations between the two police authorities. These are the instruments installed
by the Act to guarantee checks and balances.
National platform: Landelijk Overleg Veiligheid en Politie (LOVP)
Previously, we mentioned the platform (LVOP), where local police authorities could indirectly exert
influence on the national police policy. However, the survey results show the lack of influence
perceived by regional mayors on the allocation of police capacity and the (draft) police budget. The
first period after the transition to the national police was characterised by disputes between the
minister and the platform (LVOP) about the division of power over the police. Regional mayors
were the new positions in the police system, and, as such, they had yet to organize their own
information position and channels for input from the other mayors within their regional unit.
Regarding checks and balances, our results indicate a weak position of the mayors of small
municipalities who lack the authority of regional mayors and mayors of metropolises, such as
Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague. Unlike the regional mayors, they have no constituency and
no formalised channels for consultations with their colleagues. The mayor of a small municipality:
‘My role was not very transparent and clear. The Act is vague on my role. I have been doing this for
2.5 years now. When I started, I was searching. Now, I am still searching. I don’t think that I have
achieved much.’ In representing the views of mayors of smaller and mid-sized municipalities, the
LOVP platform was not evaluated positively during the term of office of the first Minister. This
picture is gradually changing. The interviews as well as the survey show the evolvement of the
LOVP into a rather well-functioning platform and meeting place for dialogue on key safety issues,
such as cybercrime, domestic burglaries, traffic enforcement, confused persons needing assistance,
and large-scale safety problems on New Years’ Eve. A joint agenda committee is now preparing the
LVOP meetings and agendas, and regional mayors are involved in the development of policies at an
earlier stage. Following the first minister in charge of the national police, his successors have showed
a very different attitude and a more open mind towards consultations in the LOVP.
In addition, our interviews show that regional mayors have developed more power in policy
development, both individually and collectively. Within their own police region, they have started
to recruit support staff to improve on their information position in order to organise communication
with the other mayors in their unit. Before the LOVPmeetings, the regional mayors and the chairman
of the board of general-prosecutors prepare their positions in preliminary consultations supported by
the office for regional mayors. Recently, the regional mayors have appointed some of their colleagues
to act as ‘portfolio holders’ on behalf of all the regional mayors in the consultations with the minster.
The role of regional mayors has gained a foothold among the mayors in their regional units and in the
police based on their personal qualities and authority as the mayors of the largest municipalities.
To conclude, the new position of regional mayor was not perceived as problematic in the
research. Nevertheless, many mayors experience the consultations in LOVP as remote and far
POLICE PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 11
away. They rarely use this route in order to influence national priorities the Minister of Justice and
Security sets out for the police.
Local policy cycle
The Act foresees that local security plans are the start of the policy cycle. However, our research results
show that many mayors and member of councils are unconvinced of this. Indeed, there is consensus
among all the survey respondents that the regional police plan does not steer nor shape police
activities. Rather, they see it as a plan on paper, an abstract agenda-setting exercise, in which national
and local targets are merged. The mutual adjustment of (national) judicial and (local) administrative
police tasks at the national, regional, and local levels has proven difficult, and, moreover, local issues
are almost never taken into account as the starting point for priority setting of the policy cycle.
On the positive side, the results show that local government has increasingly taken the lead in the
approach to local safety. Currently, local governments are obliged to develop ‘integrated local safety
plans for the duration of the mandate of the council (four years). These plans are probably the most
powerful tools to embed national police priorities within local democracy strategies. Accordingly,
the survey results show that almost all municipalities have their own integrated local safety program
framing local police activities.
Triangular consultations
Our interviews show that mayors are not very interested in actively participating in triangular
consultations above the local and district level because of the infrequency of the consultations and
because they can no longer decide on the administration of the police. They have lost interest because,
after the Act, they have no jurisdiction over the management (capacity and budget) of the police.
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, they are not interested in the policy plan of the regional unit;
decision making at the regional level is considered only a formality. Some police units have established
auxiliary structures, such as a daily board or ‘broadened triangle’ with a smaller number of mayors and
representatives from the public prosecutor office in order to strengthen decision making at the unit
level. Thus, consultations between all the mayors and the chief public prosecutor has taken on another
meaning than was intended, i.e., to ex-post legitimize decisions that are taken elsewhere. However,
these auxiliary structures have no anchoring in the Act, it is purely procedural practice.
Consultations at the district level conform to the regionalization trend of local security policies.
The survey results show that triangle meetings at the district level function to the satisfaction of the
parties involved. Many regional units have used the boundaries of the former (25) police regions
and districts as a subdivision into new districts. In practice, these triangle meetings build upon
existing consultations, which partly explains their success. They build on the existing good personal
relations in the regional police system, and coordination is achievable because of its rather limited
scale. In terms of decision making and steering, their impact is higher than triangles at the level of
the regional units. However, consultations at the district level have no legal decision-making
authority; it is, again, purely an informal procedural practice.
The vast majority of mayors in our survey believe that agreements worked out in the ‘team’ triangle
concerning police presence in their municipality do justice to the goals and priorities that their
municipality has set out. Only 9%, all of whom are mayors of smaller municipalities (up to 50,000
inhabitants), disagree. The case studies also show that some mayors of small municipalities that share
a basic police team feel that they have to compete with other municipalities for scarce police capacity.
Conclusions
The Act closed the democratic gap of the previous regional police system with regard to the
allocation of resources for the police. This was done at the regional level, where there was no
formal democratic control. However, the downside of the reform is centralism. At present, the
Minister of Justice & Security is responsible for the budget and capacity of the police, and he is
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accountable only to the National Parliament. Research results show that the Dutch police system
moved towards a centralist mode (Scholten, 2013), adopting a governance model comparable to the
Scandinavian model, with the Minister of Justice & Security as the sole minister in charge of the
police (compare Van Sluis et al., 2013).
In practice, democratic control of the police has not kept pace with this change. This is the case
despite the fact that the National Parliament has sufficient (and, indeed, even more than the previous
regional police system) formal powers to hold the minister to account. Although theMinister is in fact
more explicitly held to account, there is a tendency towards ‘incidentalism’ and politicisation at the
national level. Political interest is primarily characterized by debating eye-catching incidents. This is
a rather limited form of accountability (compare Cachet, 2015), which contrasts to the neighbouring
country Belgium. The police system and its key features have never been the subject of much serious
political debate in parliament in the Netherlands, let alone that these debates have ever been a trigger
for change, (compare Ponsaers & Devroe, 2018; Van Sluis et al., 2013).
Unlike Belgium, councils in the Netherlands have limited formal powers to influence the police.
The Act itself has not created this lack of influence; this has always been the case, even in the highly
localised police system in the post-war period and in the previous regionally organised police
system. This democratic institutional deficit is further exacerbated by a lack of interest and knowl-
edge amongst democratically elected representatives both at the local and the national levels. The
same observation is also made in previous research, for example in Van der Torre-eilert (2010) and
Verkaik (2012). However, there is a difference between big cities and smaller cities. In the big cities
members of municipal councils are actively questioning mayors on security and the police. But
these discussions are often limited to incidents instead of policy. As a result, democratic control
over priority setting and strategies is pushed to the background. Overall, a necessary prerequisite for
balancing governance and democratic control of the Dutch police is missing.
At the local level, the growing importance of an integrated approach to local security brings local
policing (at least parts of it) within reach of the municipal council. This is an important counter-
vailing power against too much centralism (compare Jones, 2003; Jones et al., 1996). On the other
hand, some developments in police work tend to weaken this, such as the trend towards regiona-
lization of local security policies and the replacement of the previous neighbourhood teams by basic
teams within the regional units that often operate at a supra-local level.
We conclude that the governance of the police below the national level seems to be concentrating
at a supra-local level, especially outside the big cities. But the consultation triangles at the district
level lack a legal basis in the Act, and there is no democratic control at this level. Agreements
developed in triangles at the district level do not guarantee the consent of each individual mayor,
nor do they provide appropriate democratic accountability to municipal councils.
For local democratic influence in the police system, the position of regional mayors is crucial.
However, the Dutch national police system has created a new democratic shortcoming. A regional
mayor cannot be called to account by one of the municipal councils, not even by his own council.
Our research shows that members of councils are not able to adequately monitor how their own
mayors deal with their requests at the regional level, or how they execute their tasks, let alone what
the regional mayor is doing at the national level (LOVP). This is a major shortcoming.
Compared to the accumulation of powers in the hands of the Minister of Justice & Security, local
police authorities (and thus councils) have considerably less influence on national police policy and
resource allocation. Within the LOVP and in the policy cycle, the (local) inputs of mayors and
regional mayors are not properly balanced against those of the minister, his department, and the
public prosecutors. Top-down policy making is still dominant. In practice, it has proven to be
difficult to organise and synchronise top-down policy planning cycles (starting within the police
force and the Ministry of Justice & Security) with cycles that start in the municipalities, councils,
and basic teams. It is far more difficult and time consuming to set up and organise bottom-up policy
cycles. There are tenacious problems with police policy; national targets always seem to outweigh
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local needs and issues despite bottom-up intentions. We conclude that there is no balance between
national and local governance and democratic control in the new national police system.
In short
The answer to our research question is that there is a democratic deficit within the Dutch police
system due to both weak formal powers and underutilisation of these powers by members of
parliament and councils. At the local level, there is a lack of local democratic influence on the police,
limited powers coupled with a lack of interest and knowledge. At the national level there are
extended powers, but in conjunction with a fixation on incidents and politicisation.
The governance, both in terms of structure as well as in practice is biased: centralist influences
are strong, not allowing for joint policy-making and for real local influence at the national level.
This situation is due to the vulnerable position of regional mayors (who represent local interests)
and to the weakness of provisions for balancing national and local elements in police
governance.
In practice, the structures for decision-making and consultations (the carriers of multilevel
governance) are complex, despite the fact that the Act clearly allocates both authority and demo-
cratic control over the police. A huge variety of informal, auxiliary structures for consultation has
been established within different police levels and units in order to fill the gaps in the Act. These
informal structures, which can be seen as manifestations of the Dutch ‘poldermodel’ in the govern-
ance of the police, further complicate effective democratic control. Our case study confirms the
difficult relation between multilevel governance and democratic control, which is observed in the
literature (compare Papadopoulos, 2007).
Mitigating factors
However, there are a number of factors that lead to more moderate conclusions. The concepts
introduced and the approach chosen can be characterised as a ‘snapshot’. The timing of such
a snapshot is relevant. One could argue that the Act was not fully implemented when the evaluation
research took place. Drastic changes require a long implementation period. This fact influences the
research results in the sense that start-up problems could be misinterpreted as issues of a structural
nature. Follow-up research is needed to fully understand the effects of the Act on all levels.
A longer-term perspective can compensate for some of the shortcomings of a snapshot
approach. Elsewhere, we have argued that the history of the Dutch police system shows that trends
towards centralisation, economies of scale and more formal democracy have always mobilised
counterforces towards more local involvement and a stronger local police force (see Cachet & van
Sluis, 2013). In our research, we have seen some examples that indicate this:
– a policy document from the national government Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2015)
that marks a different approach towards centralisation;
– the evolvement of the LOVP into a well-functioning platform for mutual adjustment;
– the increasing importance of regional mayors as policy actors, both individually and
collectively;
– a new national police chief who is in favour of empowerment of police managers at regional
and district level unit and below.
At the local level, we have pointed out the growing importance of an integrated local security
approach facilitating local governments in their tasks. This is needed especially in a more centrally
organized police system as it provides support for locally oriented policing (instead of policing that
is a mere implementation of national priorities). This brings policing back within reach of
democratically elected bodies that carry out democratic control.
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This self-correcting capability has been recognised by the respondents and interviewees in the
research. Not a single one of them is in favour of a new Act, although there are supporters of
adjustments of the system of governance. The fear of another reorganisation while this first Act is
not yet fully digested is immense.
In sum, despite deficiencies and shortcomings, both in design and in practical functioning, the
system of governance shows some tendencies that indicate an evolvement from a centralist mode
into a multilevel governance mode (Scholten, 2013) with more room to manoeuvre at
a decentralised level. This would facilitate more and better democratic control of the police. In
this respect, the system of governance has shown to be somewhat ‘resilient’, gradually adapting to
changing sentiments.
Notes
1. Police Act 2012, https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2015/09/28/first-report-from-the-2012-police-act-
politiewet-2012-evaluation-commission.
2. With this we don’t claim that this is the sole prerequisite for democratic policing. Democratic policing and the
factors that constitute democratic policing are analysed in for example Jones et al. (1996), Sklansky (2007), and
Manning (2010). This is a much broader theme than we discuss in this article. However, these authors do not
disagree on the relevance and significance of adequate structures for democratic control of the police for
democratic policing.
3. Police Act 2012, https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2015/09/28/first-report-from-the-2012-police-act-
politiewet-2012-evaluation-commission.
4. In 2017, the Ministry of Security & Justice was renamed Justice & Security.
5. The regional mayor is the main contact for the minister in a police unit. The regional mayors are supposed to
express the wishes of all the mayors in their regional police unit.
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